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“A DERELICT IN THE STREAM OF THE LAW”: 1
OVERRULING BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION
MORGEN A. SULLIVAN
INTRODUCTION
Baseball’s antitrust exemption originated in 1922 when the Su-
preme Court held that professional baseball exhibitions did not con-
stitute interstate commerce, thereby placing the sport outside the
federal antitrust laws.2 Since the exemption’s inception, scholars and
courts have questioned its continuing validity and impact. Despite the
Court’s reaffirmation, fifty years later, of the exemption’s solid en-
trenchment as an operation of stare decisis,3 lower courts continue to
struggle to define the scope of the exemption. Some courts have lim-
ited the exemption to issues involving the reserve clause system.4
However, one court recently construed the exemption to apply to the
entire business of baseball.5
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Flood, Justice
Douglas referred to the Supreme Court decision creating baseball’s antitrust exemption as “a
derelict in the stream of the law which we, its creators, should remove.” Id.
2. See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208-09 (1922).
3. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
4. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1993); But-
terworth v. National League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1994). Under
the (now defunct) reserve clause system, an athlete’s contract to play with a team for a term of
years included a clause that reserved to the team the unilateral right of contract renewal. See
JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.03 (1979); see also William S.
Robbins, Comment, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption—A Corked Bat for Owners?, 55 LA. L.
REV. 937, 958-60 (1995) (describing the rise of the reserve clause in baseball player contracts
and its relation to the antitrust exemption).
5. See McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Wash. 1995); see
also Robbins, supra note 4, at 939 n.12 (stating that baseball’s exemption encompasses all anti-
trust concerns, “from franchise relocations, to competing leagues, to player restraints”). While
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Congress presumably eliminated the confusion surrounding the
exemption’s application to players’ labor disputes when it passed the
Curt Flood Act of 1998.6 Yet, while the Act intends to bring Major
League Baseball players within the federal antitrust laws, it explicitly
does not apply to other antitrust issues such as franchise relocation,
Major League expansion, franchise ownership, marketing and li-
censing, and the minor league system.7 The limited and unsettled im-
pact of the Curt Flood Act actually reinvigorates the debate over the
scope of the original antitrust exemption.8 For example, the Minne-
sota Attorney General recently began conducting an antitrust inquiry
into the Minnesota Twins franchise and Major League Baseball in
connection with a dispute over the relocation of the team.9 However,
the investigation has been postponed pending the Minnesota Su-
preme Court’s decision as to whether baseball’s antitrust exemption
bars the state’s civil investigative demands.10 Another example dem-
onstrating the exemption’s unsettled scope involved a dispute be-
tween the New York Yankees and Major League Baseball. In 1997,
the Yankees filed an antitrust suit against the League for interfering
with a marketing deal between the franchise and the Adidas sporting
goods company.11 Although the parties settled the suit,12 a fully adju-
dicated antitrust claim against the League by an owner could have
forced a court to reexamine the exemption’s applicability in nonlabor
disputes. Since the Curt Flood Act does not clarify the exemption’s
scope and expressly refrains from addressing antitrust suits involving
franchise relocation and marketing deals,13 cases like the ones in-
volving the Twins and Yankees will continue to arise until the U.S.
Supreme Court or Congress defines the scope of the exemption.
the Court in Flood reaffirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption, it did not clarify the scope of the
exemption. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
6. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 2, 112 Stat. 2824, 2824 (to be codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 27a) (“It is the purpose of this legislation to state that major league baseball
players are covered under the antitrust laws.”); President Clinton Signs Curt Flood Act,
ANTITRUST LITIG. REP., Nov. 1998, at 17 (purporting that the Curt Flood Act “revokes base-
ball’s 70-year-old antitrust exemption in labor matters”).
7. See Curt Flood Act § 3, 112 Stat. at 2824-25.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. See John Gibeaut, Skybox Shakedown, 84 A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 68.
10. See Robert Whereatt, High Court Hears Arguments on State’s Baseball Inquiry, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 4, 1999, at 3B.
11. See Yanks and Baseball Settle Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at C4.
12. See id.
13. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824, 2825 (to be codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 27a).
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Considering the continuing debate regarding the exemption’s
foundation and scope, the Supreme Court, if given the chance, should
explicitly overrule Flood in light of the statutory construction and
stare decisis principles elucidated in State Oil Co. v. Khan,14 a recently
decided antitrust case. In State Oil, the Court decided to review and
overrule Albrecht v. Herald Co.,15 an antitrust decision that time and
experience had shown to be unworkable and unjustifiable.16 The
analysis used by the State Oil Court to overrule precedent in Albrecht
provides a basis for overruling baseball’s antitrust exemption.
The Supreme Court’s own doctrine of “positive inaction” consti-
tutes the first barrier to revoking baseball’s antitrust exemption. Posi-
tive inaction refers to the Court’s aversion to overruling a decision
that Congress has knowingly allowed to persist for many years.17 The
doctrine is a straightjacket that makes a long-standing Supreme
Court decision virtually reversal-proof because the Court, by invok-
ing the positive inaction doctrine, insulates itself from reviewing and
overruling its own decision, even if that decision was erroneous.
However, the theory underlying positive inaction was questionable at
its inception and subsequent decisions by the Court have further
eroded its foundation. The State Oil Court’s treatment of the positive
inaction doctrine casts doubt on the validity of deferring to Con-
gress’s inaction when addressing the statutory construction and inter-
pretation of antitrust laws.
After deconstructing the positive inaction doctrine, a review of
the exemption’s theoretical underpinnings should overcome stare de-
cisis concerns and lead to the overruling of the exemption. The
Court’s recognition of obsolete factual conditions and scholarly criti-
cism, as well as its dedication to principled legal reasoning, ought to
overcome any reliance interests that would support the exemption’s
continued survival.
This Note will review the rise and decline of baseball’s antitrust
exemption and propose an analytical framework for its ultimate
elimination. Part I provides background on the antitrust laws and
their relationship to other professional sports. Part II describes the
14. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
15. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
16. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 7.
17. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) (“We continue to be loath . . . to over-
turn those cases [establishing the exemption] judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction,
has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implica-
tion, has clearly evidenced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”).
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development of baseball’s antitrust exemption. Parts III and IV ex-
plain how the erosion of the positive inaction doctrine and the Su-
preme Court’s willingness to reexamine outdated antitrust precedent
lead to the conclusion that baseball’s antitrust exemption should be
overruled.
I. THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, Congress enacted the
Sherman Act18 in 1890 to prevent industrial monopolies from using
their market power to disrupt and influence the national economy.19
Section 1 of the Act forbids contracts, combinations, and conspiracies
that restrain trade.20 Section 2 prohibits monopolization as well as at-
tempts and conspiracies to monopolize.21
While Congress intended that the antitrust laws would preserve
free-market competition, the Act in fact outlaws only agreements or
trade practices that unreasonably restrain trade and competition.22
Specifically, courts deem certain economic practices to be so anti-
competitive that they are per se antitrust violations.23 However,
courts adjudge many other practices under the “rule of reason” stan-
dard, which permits the defendant to justify the restrictions as rea-
sonable restraints necessary to differentiate a product or to enable
the particular industry to exist.24 Usually professional sports other
than baseball are evaluated under the rule of reason.25
18. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994)).
19. See Anthony Sica, Note, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: Out of the Pennant Race Since
1972, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 295, 314 (1996).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
21. See id. § 2.
22. See Sica, supra note 19, at 314.
23. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 4, § 5.07. Courts often invoke the per se rule in
summary proceedings to grant the plaintiff relief without an extensive factual inquiry. See id.
24. Under the rule of reason standard, a court inquires into the questioned practice’s ef-
fects on competition, and then determines its legality or illegality based on whether the practice
promotes or suppresses competition. See National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
25. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 4, § 5.07 (Supp. 1985); Stephen F. Ross, Recon-
sidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 169, 178 (1994-1995) [hereinafter
Ross, Reconsidering] (explaining the rule of reason and citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984), as support for the proposition that “virtually all agreements among sports
league owners will be governed by the rule of reason”).
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Once baseball became exempt from the antitrust laws, other pro-
fessional sports argued that they also deserved exemption. However,
the Supreme Court consistently rejected arguments advocating the
expansion of baseball’s exemption to include other sports. For exam-
ple, in Radovich v. National Football League,26 the Court held that the
precedent creating baseball’s antitrust exemption did not shield pro-
fessional football from the scope of the antitrust laws.27 The Radovich
Court explicitly limited the exemption to the business of professional
baseball.28 A few years later in Flood, the Court reiterated that no
other interstate professional sport was exempt from the antitrust
laws.29
Although professional sports other than baseball are generally
subject to the antitrust laws, federal collective bargaining laws limit
the antitrust liability of those sports.30 Specifically, under certain con-
ditions, the law implicitly exempts franchise owners from antitrust
claims involving player labor restraints arising out of collective bar-
gaining agreements.31 Thus, all professional sports enjoy a limited an-
titrust exemption in the labor context. In addition, several profes-
sional sports, including baseball, enjoy a statutory antitrust
26. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
27. See id. at 447-48. The decision involved a professional football practice analogous to
the reserve clause contracting used in baseball. See id. at 449-50.
28. See id. at 451 (“[W]e now specifically limit the [exemption] to . . . the business of or-
ganized professional baseball.”).
29. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972) (“Other professional sports operating
interstate—football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf—are not so ex-
empt.”).
30. Sports, including baseball, did not clearly come under the coverage of the federal labor
laws until 1969 when the National Labor Relations Board assumed jurisdiction over the sports
industry. See Sica, supra note 19, at 326.
31. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-36 (1996) (speculating that when
Congress enacted the labor statutes in issue it intended to preclude judicial application of anti-
trust law to resolve labor disputes); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 612 (8th
Cir. 1976) (“Since the basis of the nonstatutory exemption is the national policy favoring collec-
tive bargaining, . . . . under appropriate circumstances, we find that a non-labor group may avail
itself of the labor exemption.”); see also Sica, supra note 19, at 352 (describing several limita-
tions on the availability of the nonstatutory exemption). More specifically, management loses
the shield of the labor exemption only when a union votes to decertify itself. See Curt Flood Act
Revokes Antitrust Exemption for Practices That Affect Employment of Major League Baseball
Players, 20 No. 7 ENT. L. REP., Dec. 1998, at 4, 5 [hereinafter Curt Flood Act Revokes]. The
Curt Flood Act does not affect the application of the nonstatutory labor exemption. See Curt
Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824, 2825 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
27a) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the application to organized profes-
sional baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.”).
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exemption in the broadcasting arena.32 Where relevant, the following
Parts of this Note consider the implications of subjecting other sports
to antitrust laws while at the same time affording them labor and
broadcasting exemptions.
II. BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Baseball’s antitrust exemption can be traced back to Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.33 In Federal Baseball, the plaintiff, a Federal League team, al-
leged that an illegal interleague conspiracy between the National and
American Leagues had led to the dissolution of all the Federal
League’s franchises except for the plaintiff.34 The appellate court re-
fused to acknowledge that an exhibition sport could constitute inter-
state commerce or trade warranting federal antitrust regulation.35 The
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s holding, ruling that
baseball games were “purely state affairs.”36 The Court reasoned that
transporting players across state lines was incidental to an activity not
considered trade or commerce in the first place.37 Since baseball did
not involve interstate commerce, the Court held that the leagues
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (exempting from antitrust laws “any joint agreement by
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball,
basketball, or hockey,” by which any league of clubs participating in one of these sports sells or
transfers the league’s member clubs’ rights to broadcast the games).
33. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
34. See id. at 207. The plaintiff alleged that the National and American Leagues, through
the use of reserve clauses in player contracts, prevented Federal League teams from securing
sufficiently talented players. See National League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball
Club, Inc., 269 F. 681, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1920). While the reserve clause agreements constituted
the underlying monopolistic devices providing a basis for the antitrust complaint, the alleged
antitrust violation concerned the reserve clause’s competitive impact on the leagues and fran-
chises, not the impact on the players. See id. at 683-84, 687. The Supreme Court also cited prac-
tices apart from the reserve clause system as underlying motivations for the antitrust conspiracy
claim. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207 (stating that the complaint “alleges that the defen-
dants destroyed the Federal League by buying up some of the constituent clubs and in one way
or another inducing all those clubs except the plaintiff to leave their League”). Hence, doubt
regarding the scope of the exemption reaches back to the Supreme Court’s Federal Baseball
decision.
35. See National League, 269 F. at 685 (declaring that a baseball game “is local in its be-
ginning and in its end”).
36. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208.
37. See id. at 209 (“[T]he exhibition, although made for money would not be called trade
or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words.”).
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were not subject to the federal antitrust laws and that the plaintiff
therefore had no basis for recovery under the Sherman Act.38
Thirty-one years later in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,39
the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to reconsider
its holding in Federal Baseball.40 Bound by precedent, the district
court adhered to the Supreme Court’s holding in Federal Baseball
that baseball falls outside the definition of interstate commerce.41 The
court of appeals affirmed that district court ruling in a single sentence
opinion.42 In reconsidering baseball’s antitrust exemption, the Su-
preme Court followed suit by devoting just a single paragraph to the
case and affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims based on “the
authority of [Federal Baseball], so far as that decision determines that
Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball
within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”43
The Supreme Court’s terse opinion left many questions unan-
swered and created some new ones. While the Federal Baseball Court
had based its decision on a Commerce Clause interpretation, never
addressing the substance of the antitrust claims underlying the case,
the Toolson Court somehow uncovered an implied congressional in-
tent regarding the antitrust laws in the Federal Baseball Court’s dis-
cussion. The Toolson Court stated that Congress, and not the Su-
preme Court, should decide whether to overrule the Federal Baseball
since “[t]he business [of baseball] has . . . been left for thirty years to
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing anti-
trust legislation.”44 The Court’s justification for deferring to Congress
was that “Congress has had the [Federal Baseball] ruling under con-
sideration but has not seen fit to bring such business [of baseball] un-
38. See id. at 208-09.
39. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
40. See id. at 357 (acknowledging Federal Baseball as the controlling case pertaining to
professional baseball’s antitrust exemption).
41. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93, 94-95 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (“If
the Supreme Court was in error in its former opinion or changed conditions warrant a different
approach, it should be the Court to correct the error.”).
42. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 200 F.2d 198, 199 (9th Cir. 1952) (“On the
grounds and for the reasons stated in its opinion . . . the order of the District Court is af-
firmed.”).
43. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
44. Id. The Court was concerned with industry reliance on the exemption and the accom-
panying retroactive application of the law. See id. (“The present case asks us to overrule the
prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable.”).
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der these [antitrust] laws.”45 However, the Toolson Court’s rationale
assumed that Congress always understood Federal Baseball to mean
what the Toolson Court was then saying it meant—that Congress had
no intention to include baseball under the antitrust laws—instead of
what Federal Baseball actually said—that baseball is not trade or
commerce.46 Regardless, the Court found that the plaintiff did not
have a claim under federal antitrust laws.47
The Toolson dissent wanted to review Federal Baseball’s factual
underpinnings by reexamining baseball’s status in relation to the
Commerce Clause.48 Unlike the Toolson majority and the Federal
Baseball Court, the Toolson dissent acknowledged the position that
baseball “enjoys in the hearts of our people and the possible justifica-
tion of special treatment for organized sports which are engaged in
interstate trade or commerce.”49 Still, the dissent argued that only
Congress can affirmatively exempt interstate sports industries from
the scope of the antitrust laws.50
By the time Flood v. Kuhn51 was decided nineteen years later,
baseball was considered a “national pastime” worthy of special con-
45. Id.
46. In fact, as the Toolson dissent noted, subsequent to the decision in Federal Baseball,
Congress investigated whether or not it had the power to regulate baseball under the Com-
merce Clause. See id. at 361 (Burton, J., dissenting). Such an inquiry must have resulted from a
Commerce Clause–based understanding of Federal Baseball’s holding. Interestingly, around the
time of the congressional inquiry, four bills were introduced in Congress that would have cre-
ated a complete antitrust exemption not only for baseball, but for all professional sports such
that “[t]he law would no longer require competition in any facet of business activity of any
sport enterprise.” Id. at 361 n.9 (Burton, J., dissenting). However, the House Subcommittee on
Study of Monopoly Power recommended the postponement of legislation until the courts clari-
fied Federal Baseball. See EMMANUEL CELLER, ORGANIZED BASEBALL, H.R. REP. NO. 82-
2002, at 134-36, 231-32 (1952).
47. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (“Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the
judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs.”).
48. See id. at 360 (Burton, J., dissenting) (“In the Federal Baseball Club case the Court did
not state that even if the activities of organized baseball amounted to interstate trade or com-
merce those activities were exempt from the Sherman Act.”). In United States v. International
Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, the Justices disagreed about the Toolson Court’s characteriza-
tion of the Federal Baseball holding. The majority stated that “Toolson neither overruled Fed-
eral Baseball nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal Baseball.” Id. at 242. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Minton stated “[i]n Toolson . . . we reaffirmed the holding of [Fed-
eral Baseball].” Id. at 251 (Minton, J., dissenting).
49. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting).
50. See id. (“[T]he authorization of such [antitrust] treatment is a matter within the discre-
tion of Congress.”).
51. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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sideration by the courts.52 In Flood, the Supreme Court revisited the
“troublesome and unusual situation” that arose when baseball’s re-
serve clause system was challenged under federal antitrust laws.53 Af-
ter reviewing the precedent and the history behind the antitrust ex-
emption, the Court finally conceded that baseball was a business
engaged in interstate commerce.54 However, the Court did not ex-
amine the case under the Commerce Clause.55 Instead, it held that
while Federal Baseball and Toolson were possibly “‘unrealistic, in-
consistent, or illogical’” decisions, they were established “aberra-
tion[s]” restricted to baseball.56 The Court justified the aberrations
based on “baseball’s unique characteristics and needs,” and con-
cluded, without review of the underlying issues, that stare decisis en-
titled the exemption to judicial protection.57
The Court circumvented a full stare decisis discussion in Flood
by invoking the “positive inaction” doctrine alluded to in Toolson.58
Applying the positive inaction doctrine, the Court concluded that
Congress had no intention of subjecting baseball to the antitrust laws
since it never passed remedial legislation in response to the prior
holdings establishing the exemption.59 The Flood Court stated that
52. See id. at 267 (“‘The game is on higher ground; it behooves everyone to keep it
there.’”) (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). This quote followed
Justice Blackmun’s lengthy description of the national history and pride associated with base-
ball. See id. at 260-64. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun also approvingly quoted a concurrence
to the decision by the court of appeals, which argued that “‘[b]aseball’s welfare and future
should not be for politically insulated interpreters of technical antitrust statutes but rather
should be for the voters through their elected representatives.’” Id. at 268 n.9 (quoting Flood v.
Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., concurring)).
53. Id. at 269.
54. See id. at 282.
55. The Flood Court reiterated the reliance and retroactive application concerns first al-
luded to in Toolson but did not examine the extent of the harm that would result if it did over-
turn the exemption. See id. at 283-84. Justice Marshall dissented, stating that the reliance and
retroactivity problems could be minimized if antitrust laws were made applicable to baseball
only prospectively. See id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 282 (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
57. Id. The Court did not describe what constituted “baseball’s unique characteristics and
needs.” Presumably, baseball’s needs would have to consist of more than its status as a profes-
sional sport since the Court refused to exempt other professional sports from the federal anti-
trust laws. See id. at 282-83. The Court seemed to become mired in the cultural mystique of
baseball—a revered and unique institution that should be beyond judicial tampering—to avoid
addressing the actual concerns associated with opening an industry to retroactive antitrust at-
tack. See id. at 260-64, 266-68 (discussing the esteem associated with the game and implying
that courts should not interfere with the mechanics of the industry).
58. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
59. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 281, 283 (reasoning that although numerous legislative propos-
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Congress’s inaction “has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove
[of prior decisions] legislatively.”60 In other words, overruling the ex-
emption would have undermined the “congressional intent” discov-
ered in Toolson,61 as well as Congress’s desire—as demonstrated by
its affirmative legislative silence on the matter—to maintain the
status quo.62 The Court held that Congress should be responsible for
considering any reliance issues associated with a decision whether or
not to overrule Federal Baseball.63
In Toolson the Court only referred in the vaguest terms to the
reliance component considered in stare decisis review. For example,
the opinion stated that “[t]he business [of baseball] has thus been left
for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not sub-
ject to existing antitrust legislation. The present case asks us to over-
rule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legisla-
tion applicable.”64 However, despite such allusions to reliance, the
Toolson Court declined to evaluate the reliance argument, stating
that Congress, not the Court, should determine what, if any, modifi-
cations should be made to baseball’s judicially created antitrust ex-
emption.65 Since the Court decided to abdicate to Congress the
authority to review and overrule Supreme Court precedent, Tool-
son’s holding primarily stands on the Court’s positive inaction doc-
trine rather than any legitimate adherence to judicial precedent.66
Yet, in following Toolson and deferring to Congress, the Flood ma-
jority “failed to note . . . that it was the Supreme Court and not Con-
als relating to baseball’s antitrust exemption had been made since the Toolson decision, only
bills that would have expanded the exemption to other sports gained much support).
60. Id. at 284.
61. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (“Remedial legislation has been introduced repeatedly in
Congress but none has ever been enacted.”).
63. See id. at 283-84.
64. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); see also infra note 125
and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the factors considered in reexamining prece-
dent.
65. See id. (“We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to
[the business of baseball] of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation. Without re-
examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below are affirmed . . . .”).
66. Although the Flood Court acknowledged reliance concerns, it did not examine them.
Like the Toolson Court, the Flood majority deferred to Congress with respect to reliance is-
sues. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84 (stating that changes should be made “by the Congress and
not by this Court”).
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gress that had created and perpetuated the illogical [antitrust] ex-
emption.”67
In addition to its legacy of illogic, the Flood Court left the anti-
trust exemption’s scope unclear. At one point, the Court stated that
baseball’s “reserve system enjoy[ed] exemption from the federal anti-
trust laws.”68 However, the Court concluded its decision by quoting a
Toolson passage: “‘Congress had no intention of including the busi-
ness of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.’”69
Hence, it is unclear whether the Court was holding that the exemp-
tion extends to all activities qualifying as “the business of baseball”
or that the exemption is limited to the reserve clause.70
Baseball’s antitrust exemption consists of a unique blend of judi-
cially mandated congressional deference, statutory construction, and
an unusual application of stare decisis. For the Supreme Court to re-
examine the exemption’s underpinnings on the merits, a two-step
analysis is required. First, the positive inaction doctrine itself needs to
be reviewed in light of stare decisis considerations. Second, the Court
should consider State Oil’s teachings about unworkable, anachronis-
tic, and factually unjustified antitrust precedent and recognize how
the State Oil framework undercuts the positive inaction doctrine. Af-
ter recognizing that the positive inaction doctrine lacks the strength
to justify perpetuating the original Toolson holding, the Court should
apply the State Oil analysis to reverse Flood and eliminate baseball’s
illogical antitrust exemption.
67. Larry C. Smith, Comment, Beyond Peanuts and Cracker Jack: The Implications of
Lifting Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 113, 122 (1996); see also Flood,
407 U.S. at 286 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“While I joined the Court’s opinion in [Toolson], I
have lived to regret it; and I would now correct what I believe to be its fundamental error.”); id.
at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is this Court that has made [the baseball players] impotent,
and this Court should correct its error.”); cf. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397, 409 n.15 (1975) (“This Court, in other appropriate contexts, has not hesitated to overrule
an earlier decision and settle a matter of continuing concern, even though relief might have
been obtained by legislation.”) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 n.1
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
68. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 285 (emphasis added) (quoting Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357).
70. Subsequent to Flood, lower courts have debated the scope of the exemption. See supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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III. THE POSITIVE INACTION DOCTRINE
The positive inaction doctrine has a lengthy history in Supreme
Court jurisprudence.71 While the doctrine played a particularly impor-
tant role in the Court’s decision in Flood,72 it has subsequently been
severely questioned with only infrequent resurgence delaying its ul-
timate abandonment.
A. A Reexamination of the Positive Inaction Doctrine
Ironically, prior to Toolson the Supreme Court had expressed
strong sentiments against basing its decisions on congressional inac-
tion. In Helvering v. Hallock,73 the court stated the following with re-
gard to the importance of stare decisis in statutory interpretation:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congres-
sional silence to debar this Court from reexamining its own doc-
trines. To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Con-
gress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative
unrealities. . . . This Court . . . has from the beginning rejected a doc-
trine of disability at self-correction.74
The Hallock Court recognized that congressional failure to act
on an erroneous decision should not influence the Court’s ability to
reexamine its own precedent.75 The Court justified its position by fo-
71. Professor Stephen Ross has contributed significantly to the discourse on the positive
inaction doctrine as it pertains to baseball’s antitrust exemption. See Ross, Reconsidering, supra
note 25, at 182-88, 191-95, 201-04 (arguing that legislative inaction after Flood can be attributed
to factors other than reliance concerns (e.g., lobbying)).
72. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1404
(1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling] (“Flood v. Kuhn is an unusually strong case for the
acquiescence argument . . . .”).
73. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
74. Id. at 119-21 (footnotes omitted); see also Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70
(1946) (referring to Hallock for the proposition that neither congressional silence nor equivocal
legislative history precludes the Court from reviewing its own doctrines). Hallock and Girouard
were decided after Federal Baseball (Commerce Clause–based holding) but before Toolson
(positive inaction–based holding). But cf. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940)
(“The long time failure of Congress to alter the [Sherman] Act after it had been judicially con-
strued . . . is persuasive evidence of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the
correct one.”).
75. See Hallock, 309 U.S. at 120 (“Nor does want of specific Congressional repudia-
tions . . . serve as an implied instruction by Congress to us not to reconsider . . . whether those
decisions . . . make for dissonance of doctrine.”). But cf. Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1957) (discussing the baseball antitrust exemption as illogical). In Rado-
vich, the Court stated: “[T]he orderly way to eliminate error . . . is by legislation and not by
court decision. Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole industry
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cusing on considerations beyond mere congressional unawareness
that might explain congressional inaction: parliamentary tactics and
strategy.76 In other words, the Court recognized that congressional
silence might be a product of certain political procedural considera-
tions rather than the substantive acceptance of a court decision. In
addition, the Court alluded to the trouble that could result from de-
riving meaning from congressional inaction, since “we walk on quick-
sand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a
controlling legal principle.”77
Given the Curt Flood Act, as well as the numerous bills intro-
duced by Congress regarding baseball’s antitrust status, it cannot be
the case that Congress has been merely unaware of the Federal Base-
ball–Toolson–Flood trilogy.78 However, Congress had several strate-
gic, parliamentary, and practical reasons, apart from doctrinal accep-
tance, justifying its failure to pass remedial antitrust legislation after
Federal Baseball and its progeny. For example, prior to Toolson,
baseball’s interstate nature was still evolving.79 Although only one
year prior to Toolson a congressional subcommittee had found that
professional baseball did involve interstate commerce,80 exactly when
baseball became a well-defined interstate activity remains unclear.
As a matter of strategy, Congress may have decided not to regulate
baseball until the industry had grown to the point where it clearly in-
volved interstate commerce. Congressional inaction during the years
hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation. . . . The whole scope
of congressional action would be known in advance . . . .” Id. at 452. It is possible the Radovich
Court was making a special accommodation for the baseball industry in order to control for an
erroneous decision that the Court made itself. Most likely, the Radovich Court’s statement re-
garding the formulation of legislation was an attempt to address the reliance issues involved
with overruling precedent, since Congress never specifically passed legislation exempting base-
ball from the antitrust laws in the first place. However, the Court has generally refused to defer
to congressional silence when asked to examine reliance issues as they pertain to the antitrust
laws. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
State Oil v. Khan, in which the Court affirmed its longstanding ability to review its precedent as
it pertains to antitrust laws).
76. See Hallock, 309 U.S. at 121 (“Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and
strategy might [explain] the inaction . . . of Congress.”).
77. Id.
78. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 (1972) (noting that “[l]egislative proposals have
been numerous and persistent” and have dealt with both “the applicability or nonapplicability
of the antitrust laws to baseball”).
79. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 358-60 (1953) (Burton, J., dis-
senting) (examining the growth of baseball following Federal Baseball).
80. See EMMANUEL CELLER, ORGANIZED BASEBALL, H.R. REP. NO. 82-2002, at 5 (1952)
(“Inherently, professional baseball is intercity, intersectional, and interstate.”).
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between Federal Baseball and Toolson may reflect lawmakers’ tacit
weighing of options in light of baseball’s changing nature, rather than
a silent endorsement of the antitrust exemption.81
The intricate political process underlying most legislative acts
might also explain why Congress did not take any curative action.
Professor William Eskridge has suggested several possible political
explanations for Congress’s inaction: general congressional apathy
toward the Federal Baseball decision that in turn led to a lack of con-
sensus on the remedy; disapproval of the decision by a congressional
majority that might have been roadblocked by a minority; devotion
of congressional attention to higher priorities; or strategic maneu-
vering by a congressional majority to exchange its support for cura-
tive legislation in return for other political promises.82
Members of Congress might also have endorsed or objected to
proposed baseball legislation based on considerations distinct from
their feelings on the validity of Federal Baseball and its progeny. For
example, during the 1994 baseball players’ strike “Congress was of-
fering to repeal [the] antitrust exemption in return for a promise by
the players to return to work.”83 In addition, some Senate opposition
to eliminating the exemption historically came from senators who
feared that their states might lose their major league teams in com-
petitive franchise relocations or that their minor league teams might
suffer if restrictive player contracts became illegal.84 Also, after Tool-
81. Part of Congress’s hesitancy to act also might have stemmed from the 1952 subcommit-
tee report which concluded:
It would therefore seem premature to enact general legislation for baseball at this
time. Legislation is not necessary until the reasonableness of the reserve rules has
been tested by the courts. . . . [T]he courts may have to differentiate the unreason-
able features of baseball’s rules and regulations from those which are reasonable and
necessary.
Id. at 231-32. Thus, the subcommittee’s statement indicates that congressional silence might
have been due to deference to the courts.
82. See Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 72, at 1405-06; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 99-100 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, In-
terpreting] (approving of Hallock and further explaining the flaws in the Flood Court’s interpre-
tation of Congress’s inaction).
83. Robbins, supra note 4, at 969. The Curt Flood Act was motivated by the desire to give
professional baseball players legal protection in order to curtail the numerous strikes and work
stoppages that have plagued the industry. See President Clinton Signs Curt Flood Act, supra
note 6, at 17.
84. See Daniel S. Mason & Trevor Slack, Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Prac-
tice? Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, and the Franchise Relocation Issue, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 399,
407 (1997) (noting that “politicians are leery about losing a franchise while they are in office”);
Smith, supra note 67, at 132 (discussing legislative opposition to reform efforts).
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son and Flood, developments in collective bargaining, along with
other piecemeal legislation affecting baseball, might have redirected
congressional efforts regarding the exemption by shifting Congress’s
focus to more discrete and less comprehensive remedial legislation.85
In short, congressional silence regarding the exemption can be char-
acterized as a function of circumstance and the political process
rather than an endorsement or disapproval of the Federal Baseball–
Toolson–Flood trilogy.
In denouncing positive inaction, the Hallock Court was also wary
of imputing to Congress a “hypothetical recognition of coherence”
regarding a line of precedent.86 Ironically, the Flood Court boldly im-
puted to Congress an extreme and nonexistent “recognition of coher-
ence” by inferring from congressional silence approval of the line of
cases creating baseball’s antitrust exemption, a line of cases that the
Court itself viewed as an “aberration,” and as “‘unrealistic, inconsis-
tent, or illogical.’”87 The Flood Court believed that Congress could
sort out the precedent that evolved from Federal Baseball88 even
though the Court itself was having trouble logically justifying base-
ball’s exemption in light of the sport’s interstate evolution and the
different antitrust treatment for similar professional sports.89
Despite the language in Hallock and its clear implications for
baseball, neither the Toolson nor the Flood majorities mentioned the
Hallock opinion. Ignoring the political justifications for congressional
inaction outlined in Hallock, the Flood Court confidently stated that
it “continue[d] to be loath . . . to overturn [Federal Baseball and
Toolson] judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has al-
85. See Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: It’s Going, Going . . . Gone!,
20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1248-49 (1996) (noting that statutory and nonstatutory labor law devel-
opments in the collective bargaining arena have placed the activities of players’ labor unions
beyond the scope of antitrust laws); Kathleen L. Turland, Note, Major League Baseball and
Antitrust: Bottom of the Ninth, Bases Loaded, Two Outs, Full Count and Congress Takes a
Swing, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1329, 1350-51 (1995) (noting that the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961 provides professional sports leagues with broadcasting rights exempt from the antitrust
laws). The Curt Flood Act, the latest piecemeal legislation affecting baseball, does not fore-
close the debate over the exemption since the Act is very ambiguous. See infra Part III.C.
86. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 122 (1940).
87. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
88. See id. at 284 (stressing that changes should be left to “Congress and not . . . this
Court”).
89. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452 (conceding certain similarities between baseball and
football); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357-59 (1953) (Burton, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing economic factors that suggest baseball is an interstate activity).
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lowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere in-
ference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disap-
prove them legislatively.”90 However, the Court had no reliable evi-
dence that Congress refrained from passing legislation because it
approved of the exemption. Instead, the majority just assumed that
Congress approved of the exemption because it did not pass legisla-
tion. Professor Eskridge, reiterating the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Hallock, points out that such an assumption is an extremely
speculative basis for grounding legal reasoning since it does not ac-
count for the realities of the political process.91 In addition, Justice
Douglas, a member of the Toolson majority, dissented in Flood and
admonished the Flood majority for disregarding Hallock’s wisdom
regarding the dangers associated with reliance on congressional inac-
tion.92
90. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84. “Congressional silence” should be considered synonymous
with “positive inaction.” The Hallock Court included parliamentary tactics and strategy as well
as mere congressional unawareness as possible explanations of “congressional silence.” See
Hallock, 309 U.S. at 120-21. The Flood Court implicitly recognized the Hallock Court’s con-
cerns with congressional tactics and strategy when it stated: “Remedial legislation has been in-
troduced repeatedly in Congress but none has ever been enacted. . . . This, obviously, has been
deemed [in Federal Baseball and Toolson] to be something other than mere congressional si-
lence and passivity.” Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added). In turn, the discussions in both
Hallock and Flood lead to the conclusion that any tactical or strategic congressional action or
inaction short of enacting a bill into law should be considered “congressional silence” or “posi-
tive inaction.” Justice Scalia goes one step further and attributes no useful meaning to congres-
sional activity occurring prior to enacting a bill into law:
The Constitution sets forth the only manner in which the Members of Congress have
the power to impose their will upon the country: by a bill that passes both Houses
and is either signed by the President or repassed by a supermajority after his veto.
Everything else the Members . . . do is either prelude or internal organization.
United States v. Estate of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478, 1488-89 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 82, at 96 (“In none of the more than
fifty bills that Congress considered [regarding the application of the antitrust laws to baseball]
did both Houses agree; hence, there was no article I legislative enactment entitled to authorita-
tive consideration by the Court.”). Justice Scalia probably would not bother to distinguish be-
tween “positive inaction” and “congressional silence” since, by his way of thinking, the activity
underlying either carries no import as a judicial concern.
91. See Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 82, at 98-100 (discussing the difficulties of
drawing inferences from legislative inaction); Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 72, at 1405
(“The vagaries of the political process make it hard to determine what Congress’s ‘positive in-
action’ meant.”).
92. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 287 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s reliance upon
congressional inaction disregards the wisdom of Helvering v. Hallock . . . .”). The majority even
acknowledged a case which supported Douglas’s position. See id. at 283 (citing Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970)). The Boys Markets Court
stated that “in the absence of any persuasive circumstances evidencing a clear design that con-
gressional inaction be taken as acceptance of [a judicial decision], the mere silence of Congress
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Many years after Flood, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,93
the Court revisited and reaffirmed its earlier position of avoiding re-
liance on congressional inaction as a factor in statutory stare decisis
review.94 Although the Patterson Court acknowledged the heightened
stare decisis considerations in cases involving statutory interpreta-
tion,95 it refused to conclude that “Congress’ failure to overturn a
statutory precedent is reason for [the] Court to adhere to it.”96 The
Court reasoned that it is impossible to state with confidence that this
congressional failure to act represents affirmative approval of a deci-
sion.97 In addition, the Court warned against reading too much into
the failures or partial successes of congressional bills as a means to
ascertain congressional acceptance or rejection of Supreme Court
rulings.98
After Patterson, the Court continued to chip away at the positive
inaction doctrine. In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.,99
Justice Blackmun, author of the Flood opinion, chastised an appellate
court for inferring congressional intent in a situation where Congress
considered but failed to pass legislation.100 Justice Blackmun reasoned
as follows:
is not a sufficient reason for refusing to reconsider the decision.” Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 242.
93. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
94. See id. at 175 n.1 (stating that it is wrong to infer “affirmative congressional approval”
from legislative inaction). But see Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330,
338 (1988) (“[W]e have recognized that Congress’ failure to disturb a consistent judicial inter-
pretation of a statute may provide some indication that ‘Congress at least acquiesces in, and
apparently affirms, that [interpretation].’”) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)).
95. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175 n.1 (“[C]onsiderations of stare decisis have added force
in statutory cases because Congress may alter what we have done by amending the statute.”);
infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
96. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175 n.1.
97. See id. (“It is ‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional fail-
ure to act represents’ affirmative congressional approval of the Court’s statutory interpreta-
tion.”) (quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)).
98. See id. (discussing the danger of congressional “ratification”). In addition to the Su-
preme Court’s case-by-case rejection of reliance on congressional inaction, at least one empiri-
cal study has concluded that the lack of an underlying pattern regarding congressional over-
rides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations “calls into question the view that
congressional inaction necessarily implies approval” of the Court’s interpretation. Michael E.
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 451 (1992).
99. 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
100. See id. at 649-50 (criticizing the Second Circuit for inferring congressional approval of
follow-on plans from Congress’s failure to prohibit them in the 1987 amendments to the Em-
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[S]ubsequent legislative history is a “hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier” Congress. It is a particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute when it
concerns . . . a proposal that does not become law. Congressional in-
action lacks “persuasive significance” because “several equally ten-
able inferences” may be drawn from such inaction . . . .101
Although Pension Benefit was factually distinct from Flood, the
Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged that its holding in Pen-
sion Benefit regarding congressional inaction runs contrary to Flood’s
earlier pronouncement on the matter.102 In sum, since Flood, the
Court has handed down a series of decisions that have seriously
eroded the positive inaction doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings.
B. State Oil v. Khan, the Antitrust Laws, and Positive Inaction
Normally the burden to justify overruling precedent is greater
when statutory construction rather than constitutional interpretation
is involved.103 The heightened burden for statutory review stems from
ployee Retirement Security Act of 1974). Later, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689
(1992), Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for concluding that congressional inaction con-
stituted an “apparent acceptance of the Court’s earlier construction of [a] diversity stat-
ute . . . .” Id. at 701 n.5. The majority cites Flood to counter Justice Blackmun’s criticism. See id.
(citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972)). Justice Blackmun unsuccessfully attempted
to distinguish his position in Ankenbrandt from his discussion in Flood. See id. at 715-16
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It is one thing for this Court to defer to more than a century of
practice unquestioned by Congress. It is quite another to defer on a pretext that Congress leg-
islated what in fact it never did.”). Ironically, he criticized the Court for going to “remarkable
lengths to craft an exception that is simply not in the statute and is not supported by the case
law.” Id. at 707 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun’s statement could just as easily
undercut Toolson’s invocation of Federal Baseball as support for the notion that “Congress had
no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
101. Pension Benefit, 496 U.S. at 650 (citations omitted).
102. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (citing Pension
Benefit and Flood and admitting that the Court’s decisions on congressional inaction “have not
been consistent”); see also United States v. Estate of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478, 1488 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“First and most obviously, Congress can not express its will by a failure
to legislate. The act of refusing to enact a law (if that can be called an act) has utterly no legal
effect, and thus has utterly no place in a serious discussion of the law.”); United States v. Wells,
519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997) (“[T]he significance of subsequent congressional action or inaction
necessarily varies with the circumstances . . . .”); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994)
(acknowledging that congressional silence lacks persuasive significance, especially when an
administrative regulation is inconsistent with the controlling statute). But see Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1992) (using Congress’s silence to buttress the prevailing statutory
interpretation of the Hobbs Act).
103. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“[T]he burden borne
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the idea that Congress can legislatively alter the Supreme Court’s
rulings on statutory interpretation but cannot as easily modify consti-
tutional interpretation.104 However, the burden for antitrust review
can be described as a hybrid between the constitutional and statutory
burdens.105 In the recent case of State Oil Co. v. Khan,106 the Supreme
Court reiterated the special status of antitrust review:
In the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest [against the
Court’s reluctance to overrule decisions involving statutory interpre-
tation], well represented in this Court’s decisions, in recognizing and
adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated
experience. Thus, the general presumption that legislative changes
should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman
Act in light of the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts
to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on com-
mon-law tradition. . . .” Accordingly, this Court has reconsidered its
decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpin-
nings of those decisions are called into serious question.107
In a statement reminiscent of Hallock’s general pronouncement re-
garding the Court’s ability to reconsider its precedent, the Court re-
served the right to review its antitrust decisions. State Oil’s instruc-
tion on reconsidering precedent is even more relevant than Hallock’s
since State Oil pertains specifically to the Court’s authority to review
antitrust law. The antitrust laws have been defined and shaped by the
courts for over a century through the use of common law tradition
because Congress purposely made the antitrust statutes textually
broad.108 In turn, the courts that define and shape the antitrust law
by the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the
Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction.”).
104. See id. at 172-73 (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the leg-
islative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”). But see
Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 72, at 1363 (noting that the Supreme Court overruled or ma-
terially modified statutory precedents more than 80 times between 1961 and 1988 despite an
alleged “super-strong presumption” against overruling statutory precedent).
105. Reviewing the precedent underlying baseball’s antitrust exemption results in a hybrid
analysis in itself since the original Commerce Clause–based exemption has evolved into an is-
sue of statutory interpretation and application over time.
106. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
107. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
108. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(“Statutes like the Sherman Act . . . were written in broad general language on the under-
standing that the courts would have wide latitude in construing them to achieve the remedial
purposes that Congress had identified.”); National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435
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ought to retain the capability to review and revise decisions when the
theories underlying those decisions are called into doubt.109
Thus, two lines of thought lead to a rejection of the positive inac-
tion doctrine as it applies to baseball’s antitrust exemption. First, as it
generally pertains to congressional intent, the positive inaction doc-
trine has been eroded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court’s State Oil decision has rebutted the pre-
sumption that only Congress should review and modify the
application of antitrust statutes. Accordingly, the Court should re-
consider and reject its former position on positive inaction as it per-
tains to baseball and should then review the exemption’s theoretical
underpinnings on their merits.
C. The Curt Flood Act and the Positive Inaction Doctrine
The Curt Flood Act,110 recently enacted by Congress, highlights
the problem with relying on the positive inaction doctrine as a guid-
ing legal principle. The Act, which affords Major League Baseball
players a limited cause of action under the antitrust laws,111 has rein-
vigorated the debate over the scope and future of the antitrust ex-
emption. When the Act was being considered, Representative Henry
Hyde portrayed the Act as carving out a labor exception from a
broader antitrust exemption.112 In contrast, Senator Patrick Leahy as-
serted that the Act “end[s] what is left of baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion.”113 However, the Act explicitly states that its sole purpose is to
U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“[Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the [Sherman Act’s]
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”); see also Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to
the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 266, 268-69
(1986) (discussing antitrust’s “constitution-like vagueness”); Eskridge, Overruling, supra note
72, at 1381 (“Flood v. Kuhn is an almost comical adherence to the strict rule against overruling
statutory precedents, particularly considering that the Sherman Act has developed essentially
through a common law process.”).
109. See Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 72, at 1377 (arguing that courts should “be given
the leeway to experiment and overrule prior interpretations in a common law fashion”).
110. Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 27a).
111. See id. § 2, 112 Stat. at 2824.
112. See 144 CONG. REC. H9943 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (“[The
bill] leaves completely unchanged all aspects of the baseball exemption except for the narrow
issue of the labor relations of major league players . . . . The bill was carefully drafted . . . to
leave the remainder of the exemption intact.”).
113. 144 CONG. REC. S10,417 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy). How-
ever, it is not clear that Senator Leahy really meant that the Act would eliminate the exemp-
tion. See 144 CONG. REC. S9621 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The bill
affects no pending or decided cases except to the extent that courts have exempted major
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afford major league baseball players the same protection under the
antitrust laws that other professional athletes currently receive.114 A
plain-meaning reading of the entire Act reveals that the statute
should merely give major league baseball players the same antitrust
protection already afforded to other professional players.115
If baseball’s antitrust exemption only extends to players’ labor
disputes, the Act could be characterized as overruling Flood.116 How-
ever, since several courts have held that the exemption extends to
matters beyond labor disputes,117 the Act alternatively could be
viewed as a congressional attempt to codify the broadest possible ex-
emption by negative implication.118 Yet, because the Act does not ex-
pressly and affirmatively codify the baseball antitrust exemption and
the courts have not clearly defined the exemption’s scope, the Act
cannot be said to overrule Flood or to alter the idea that the Supreme
Court can resolve judicially the scope and validity of the exemption.119
league baseball clubs from the antitrust laws in their dealings with major league players.”).
114. See Curt Flood Act, § 2, 112 Stat. at 2824 (“[M]ajor league baseball players will have
the same rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes . . . .”); see also 144
CONG. REC. S9495 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[P]rofessional baseball
players [will] have the same rights as other professional athletes . . . .”). The Act also states that
it “does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context . . . .” Curt Flood
Act § 2, 112 Stat. at 2824.
115. See 144 CONG. REC. S9495 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“With
this historic agreement, I am confident that Congress will, once and for all, make clear that pro-
fessional baseball players have the same rights as other professional athletes . . . .”); Statement
by the President, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2150, 2150 (Nov. 2, 1998) (signing the Curt
Flood Act into law on Oct. 27, 1998) (“The [Curt Flood] Act in no way codifies or extends the
baseball exemption and would not affect the applicability of those laws to certain matters that,
it has been argued, the exemption would legitimately protect (including franchise relocation
rules and the minor leagues).”).
However, major league baseball players are still subject to the nonstatutory exemption.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Therefore, “in order for major league baseball
players to take advantage of the Curt Flood Act, they would have to first vote to decertify their
Players Association . . . and that would be a truly ‘scorched earth’ and suicidal tactic.” Curt
Flood Act Revokes, supra note 31, at 5.
116. See Eldon L. Ham, Congress Takes a Swing at Baseball Monopoly, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Nov. 20, 1998, at 5 (“Congress has finally addressed the Major League Baseball anti-
trust exemption, eliminating the 76-year-old anomaly with little fanfare.”).
117. See infra notes 169-72.
118. See Curt Flood Act § 2, 112 Stat. at 2824 (“[T]he passage of this Act does not change
the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other person or
entity.”); supra note 112 and accompanying text.
119. Senator Hatch assured Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota that the Curt Flood Act
would have no effect on the courts’ resolution of the scope of the exemption beyond what the
Act specifically covers. See 144 CONG. REC. S9621 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (“The bill does not change current law in any other context or with respect to any other
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In fact, the passage of the Curt Flood Act supports the idea that
upholding Flood based on the positive inaction doctrine was ill
founded. The Act demonstrates that congressional silence might be a
product of something other than acquiescence in, or approval of, a
Court decision. The Act originated from a collective bargaining
agreement that required the owners and players to negotiate a lim-
ited repeal of the exemption.120 Although Congress could have used
the Act as an opportunity to expressly codify or rebuke the Flood
holding, it refrained from explicitly defining the exemption’s scope.121
Congress’s decision not to address baseball’s antitrust exemption as a
whole may constitute an endorsement of the broader exemption, or it
might be the result of the practical political realization that Congress
could not or did not want to convince a majority to pass such a law.
Most likely, the Act was a short-term political compromise to facili-
tate a collective bargaining agreement between the owners and play-
ers.122
Furthermore, the Curt Flood Act demonstrates that positive in-
action is a poor indicator of congressional intent. Since the Act limits
baseball’s antitrust exemption, its passage invalidates the Flood
Court’s reliance on inferences drawn from the fact that “[the bills
that passed one house or the other] would have expanded, not re-
stricted, [baseball’s] reserve system exemption to other professional
person.”).
120. See 144 CONG. REC. H9943 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (“This
bill originates from a compromise struck during the last round of collective bargaining between
the major league owners and the major league players.”). The players had argued that the ex-
emption contributed to prior labor disputes, while the owners argued that the exemption was
irrelevant in the labor context since labor relations are covered by the nonstatutory exemption.
See id.
121. See Curt Flood Act § 3, 112 Stat. at 2824 (“No court shall rely on the enactment of this
section as a basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, prac-
tices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a) [regarding actions affecting the
employment of major league baseball players].”).
122. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-118, at 4 (1997) (“Senators Hatch and Leahy subsequently
made clear their willingness to substitute language designed to implement the intent of the
owners’ and players’ agreement, believing that a bill which enjoyed both the owners’ and play-
ers’ support would be passed expeditiously.”); 144 CONG. REC. H9943 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Hyde) (“This bill originates from a compromise struck during the last round
of collective bargaining between the major league owners and . . . players. . . . [B]oth the play-
ers and the owners were willing to support the repeal of the specific and narrow portion of the
baseball exemption covering labor relations . . . .”); 144 CONG. REC. S9497 (daily ed. July 31,
1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[While testifying, David Cone asked:] If baseball were
coming to Congress . . . [for] a statutory antitrust exemption, would such a bill be passed? The
answer to that question is a resounding no.”).
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league sports.”123 Enactment of the Curt Flood Act shows that the
Flood Court’s speculation about Congress’s desire to expand rather
than to contract the exemption’s scope was wrong. Time has proven
inferences drawn from failed legislation to be poor proxies for rea-
soned judicial analysis.124 Three points become clearer after the pas-
sage of the Curt Flood Act: (1) the courts still have the authority to
define the scope of the exemption; (2) the Supreme Court may define
the scope of the exemption and overrule what remains of Flood; and
(3) the positive inaction doctrine stands on extremely weak footing.
IV. STARE DECISIS CONSIDERATIONS
Even if it overcomes the positive inaction doctrine, the Supreme
Court still must decide whether or not stare decisis principles warrant
upholding baseball’s antitrust exemption. In general, the Supreme
Court considers four issues when deciding whether or not to overrule
a prior holding: (1) has the rule of law proven unworkable; (2) is reli-
ance on the rule so great that overruling it would cause special hard-
ship or inequity; (3) have related principles of law developed to the
point that the old rule has become anachronistic or obsolete; and (4)
have the facts underlying the rule changed so much that the old rule
lacks significance or justification?125 While a departure from stare de-
cisis requires special justification, “precedent[] [is] not sacro-
sanct . . . . [Courts] have overruled prior decisions where the necessity
and propriety of doing so has been established.”126 As Justice Frank-
furter pointed out:
[S]tare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an
element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to
satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest deci-
sion . . . when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by
experience.127
123. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 (1972).
124. See, e.g., Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 82, at 94 (“Congress is a discontinuous de-
cisionmaker. . . . Congress turns over every two years, and the ‘intent’ that is constitutionally
most relevant is the intent of the Congress that actually enacted the legislation.”).
125. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
126. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
127. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). While abandoning Flood would not
involve a return to a prior doctrine, it would encompass adopting a doctrine—the rule of rea-
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In State Oil, the Court’s stare decisis analysis resulted in its deci-
sion to overrule antitrust precedent in light of changed factual cir-
cumstances, subsequent developments in the law, scholarly criticism,
an aversion to lower courts’ erroneous application of precedent, and
reliance considerations.128 These same considerations should prompt
Flood’s overruling. In addition, the Court’s overriding dedication to
principled legal reasoning underscores the desirability of judicially
overruling Flood.
A. State Oil Co. v. Khan
The Supreme Court took the opportunity in State Oil to overrule
Albrecht v. Herald Co.,129 a decision that had established that vertical
maximum price fixing coupled with exclusive territorial restrictions
constituted a per se antitrust violation under the Sherman Act.130 In
overruling Albrecht, the Court held that the more flexible rule of rea-
son standard should be applied when evaluating vertical maximum
price fixing since subsequent judicial decisions and critical scholar-
ship had shown that the Albrecht decision was based on false eco-
nomic premises and that vertical maximum price fixing could have
procompetitive effects.131
In State Oil, the Court traced the convergence of two lines of
cases in order to explain its decision to overrule Albrecht. In the first
line of cases, the Court had deemed vertical minimum resale price
fixing per se illegal and then subsequently extended per se illegality
to vertical maximum resale price fixing.132 In the second line of cases,
the Court had evaluated the antitrust implications of exclusive verti-
cal territorial assignments.133 Initially, the Court did not rule that ex-
clusive territorial assignments were per se illegal because too little
was known about the competitive effects of such assignments.134 Four
son—that is more embracing in scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.
128. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1997).
129. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
130. See id. at 152-53.
131. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10-15. For a review of the difference between the per se rule
and the rule of reason, see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
132. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10-11 (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
133. See id. at 11-12 (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967);
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)).
134. See White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 253.
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years later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the Court re-
evaluated the territory assignment question and ruled such assign-
ments per se antitrust violations.135 Albrecht brought the two lines of
cases together because it involved the territorial assignments subject
to maximum resale price fixing.136 In accord with the rationale un-
derlying the two lines of cases, the Court held the restriction to be a
per se antitrust violation.137
In addressing Albrecht’s original underpinnings, the State Oil
Court stated that the decision was based on “theoretical justifications
for a per se rule” resulting from a “fear” that suppliers would be able
to discriminate against dealers, restrict services to certain dealers, or
use maximum price fixing to disguise minimum price fixing
schemes.138 The State Oil Court reexamined Albrecht and found the
decision to be based on false economic premises that gave rise to ex-
aggerated concerns about potential antitrust injury.139 The Court also
concluded that per se invalidation of procompetitive vertical maxi-
mum price fixing could actually harm the consumers and manufac-
turers that the antitrust laws were meant to protect.140 Considering
also the scholarly criticism of the economic principles underlying Al-
brecht,141 the Court’s waning support of Albrecht in subsequent deci-
sions,142 and the possible procompetitive effects of vertical re-
straints,143 the State Oil Court decided it was time to overrule its carte
blanche invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing and adopt the
135. See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382.
136. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968).
137. See id.
138. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 16-18.
139. See id. (stating that “there is insufficient economic justification for per se invalida-
tion”).
140. See id. at 18 (noting that “the per se rule . . . could in fact exacerbate problems related
to the unrestrained exercise of market power by monopolist-dealers”).
141. See id. at 16-18 (citing, inter alia, ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 281-
82 (1978); Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale Price
Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1007, 1034 (1991); John E.
Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 60 (1995);
Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Verti-
cal Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490 & n.17 (1983)).
142. See id. at 14 (citing Atlantic Ritchfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 335 &
n.5 (1990); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1987); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 & n.18 (1982)).
143. See id. at 14-15 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 340.30b (Supp. 1988); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1553 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 886, 887-90 (1981)).
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rule of reason standard.144 When applied to baseball’s antitrust situa-
tion, the same stare decisis considerations justify overruling the ex-
emption and analyzing antitrust claims against professional baseball
under the rule of reason.
B. Stare Decisis and Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
Just as the Supreme Court questioned in Albrecht whether or not
certain acts should be per se invalid under the antitrust laws, the
Court should be able to review baseball’s antitrust exemption, which
arguably makes all acts by team owners relating to the business of
baseball per se valid under the antitrust laws.145 Albrecht was over-
ruled in State Oil because it was grounded on theoretical economic
“fears” rather than actual economic harm and because subsequent
cases and literature called into question its theoretical underpin-
nings.146 Likewise, the Court ought to overrule baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption, an exemption that has been upheld because of exaggerated
reliance fears, baseball’s not-so-”unique characteristics and needs,”
and a discredited positive inaction doctrine.147 In addition, baseball’s
antitrust exemption should be overruled because the Federal Base-
ball–Toolson–Flood trilogy consists of cases based on obsolete fac-
tual premises and questionable legal reasoning.
1. The Intersection of State Oil and Flood. State Oil neither
explicitly affirms nor rejects the rationale underlying baseball’s
antitrust exemption. However, the State Oil Court’s brief discussion
of Toolson and Flood reinforces the idea that the exemption is
144. See id. at 22 (“In overruling Albrecht, we of course do not hold that all vertical price
fixing is per se lawful. Instead, vertical maximum price fixing . . . should be evaluated under the
rule of reason.”).
145. When looking at a rule that makes a practice per se valid or per se invalid, consider
what the Court said in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.:
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social
utility of particular commercial practices. . . . Once established, per se rules tend to
provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants
and the judicial system . . . but those advantages are not sufficient in themselves to
justify the creation of per se rules.
433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (citations omitted). In other words, per se rules that invalidate cer-
tain acts create reliance and administrative ease just as baseball’s protective exemption creates
reliance and administrative ease in the baseball industry. However, the ease that accompanies a
blanket rule does not necessarily justify imposing that rule (especially if the generalizations re-
garding the commercial practices in issue have changed as they have in the baseball industry).
146. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
147. See supra Part III.
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unusual and that congressional inaction provides a weak reason to
uphold precedent.
The State Oil Court refused to honor the Toolson–Flood positive
inaction doctrine as grounds for upholding Albrecht’s per se result.148
Although the Court’s discussion of the baseball antitrust exemption
is limited and somewhat vague, some inferences can be drawn based
on what the Court did say. First, the Court refused factually to analo-
gize Toolson and Flood to the antitrust issue in State Oil because the
baseball exemption is “an aberration” based on “‘baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs.’”149 Second, the Court rejected the idea that
the Toolson–Flood positive inaction doctrine can be used as a general
doctrine to uphold precedent.150 The Court hedged and said that even
if the positive inaction doctrine was correct, it would be given little
weight when legislative history neither clearly supports nor de-
nounces a particular ruling.151
While Toolson and Flood can be distinguished from State Oil be-
cause the facts underlying those cases are exclusive to professional
baseball, the Federal Baseball–Toolson–Flood cases can still be re-
evaluated on their merits under State Oil’s theoretical rationale.152
148. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 19. The Court stated the following regarding baseball’s anti-
trust exemption:
Respondent’s reliance on [Toolson and Flood] is similarly misplaced, because those
decisions are clearly inapposite, having to do with the antitrust exemption for profes-
sional baseball, which this Court has described as “an aberration . . . rest[ing] on a
recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.” In the
context of this case, we infer little meaning from the fact that Congress has not re-
acted legislatively to Albrecht. In any event, the history of various legislative propos-
als regarding price fixing seems neither clearly to support nor to denounce the per se
rule of Albrecht.
Id. (citations omitted). In the quoted passage, the Court is addressing the respondent’s asser-
tion that congressional inaction supports the maintenance of Albrecht’s per se rule precedent.
See Respondent’s Brief at 15, State Oil (No. 96-871). The respondent cites to Toolson and
Flood for support. See id. at 17.
149. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 19 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)). Refusal to
factually analogize does not mean that the same theoretical considerations cannot be analo-
gized when certain factual issues become ripe for consideration. See infra note 152.
150. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 19.
151. See id. (noting that “the history of various legislative proposals regarding price fixing
seems neither clearly to support nor to denounce the per se rule of Albrecht”). This was the
case with the legislative history regarding the bills introduced regarding baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 (1972) (stating that more than 50 congressional
bills have been introduced regarding the applicability or inapplicability of antitrust laws to
baseball since Toolson); see also Smith, supra note 67, at 132 (stating that more than a dozen
congressional bills have been introduced to repeal baseball’s antitrust exemption since World
War II).
152. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 15 (finding that the reasoning in Albrecht is “difficult to main-
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Like the history underlying Albrecht’s reversal, judicial decisions and
legislative activity subsequent to Toolson and Flood have signifi-
cantly weakened the positive inaction doctrine and the antitrust ex-
emption.153
Considering the mixed legislative history regarding baseball’s an-
titrust exemption in light of State Oil leads to the conclusion that the
positive inaction doctrine should be given little or no weight when the
Court next revisits the exemption. In sum, State Oil’s discussion of
the Court’s prerogative to review its own statutory interpretation of
antitrust case law154 strongly undercuts an argument for upholding
baseball’s antitrust exemption based on the positive inaction doc-
trine. Furthermore, the State Oil Court’s noncommittal reference to
baseball’s antitrust exemption sets the stage for an attack on, and
overhaul of, the exemption’s foundation.155
tain” in light of subsequent judicial decisions and legal scholarship).
153. See infra Part IV.B.2.
154. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
155. The State Oil Court’s treatment of the Flood and Toolson precedent bears a resem-
blance to the Court’s treatment of the Albrecht precedent in prior cases where, “although Al-
brecht’s continuing validity was not squarely before the Court, some disfavor with that decision
was signaled.” State Oil, 522 U.S. at 14. The State Oil Court gave weight to those signals in de-
ciding to overrule Albrecht. See id. at 14-15.
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2. Changes in Factual Underpinnings and the Subsequent
Development of Law. In overruling Albrecht, the State Oil Court
relied in part on what it called decisions that “have hinted that the
analytical underpinnings of Albrecht were substantially weakened.”156
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the facts regarding
professional baseball’s involvement in interstate commerce have
changed, undermining Federal Baseball’s Commerce Clause–based
holding.157 In addition, the Flood Court’s rationale that baseball has
“unique characteristics and needs”158 holds little weight given the
development of other professional sports, such as basketball and
football, which have survived and flourished without an antitrust
exemption similar to baseball’s exemption. Thus, both the factual and
legal premises underlying the exemption have changed, necessitating
close review of the exemption’s continuing validity.
Subsequent developments of law have significantly limited the
rationale for supporting baseball’s antitrust exemption as well. The
weakening of the positive inaction doctrine discussed in Part III
demonstrates one way that a subsequent legal development has un-
dermined the legal premise that justified maintaining the exemption.
In addition, the adoption of the rule of reason as the antitrust stan-
dard in sports law demonstrates another way that a development in
law has undermined the need for the exemption.159 Since the baseball
industry’s practices would be analyzed under the rule of reason ab-
sent the exemption, the industry would not automatically be subject
to antitrust liability upon the exemption’s extinction.160
3. Scholarly Criticism. In order to overcome stare decisis
concerns and overrule Albrecht, the State Oil Court looked to
156. Id. at 14.
157. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (holding that professional baseball is a
business engaged in interstate commerce).
158. Id.
159. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-04 (1984) (em-
phasizing that sports is “an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential
if the product is to be available at all” and adopting a rule of reason standard in its analysis).
160. Stripping baseball of its antitrust exemption would not automatically reveal antitrust
violations since its practices would still be subject to a rule of reason legal analysis. See State
Oil, 522 U.S. at 22 (“In overruling Albrecht, we of course do not hold that all vertical maximum
price fixing is per se lawful. Instead, vertical maximum price fixing, like the majority of com-
mercial arrangements subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the rule of rea-
son.”); Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 178 (citing NCAA as grounds for supposing that
baseball would be subject to rule of reason analysis).
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another antitrust precedent that was overruled in part due to
voluminous critical scholarly publications.161 Scholars have repeatedly
attacked the underpinnings of baseball’s antitrust exemption, for
example through commentary on the weakness of the positive
inaction doctrine162 and the negative legal and economic
consequences that have resulted from the exemption.163 These
criticisms, and the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of scholarly
criticism’s significance when deciding whether to review precedent,
161. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 13. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977), the Supreme Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), citing, in part, significant criticisms in scholarly literature as its basis for reconsidering
and overruling Schwinn.
162. See Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 82, passim (commenting on weakness of positive
inaction doctrine); Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 72, 1402-09 (same); Ross, Reconsidering,
supra note 25, at 182-88, 191-95, 201-04 (suggesting that legislative inaction provides little justi-
fication for maintaining the exemption); Solimine & Walker, supra note 98, at 451 (comment-
ing on the meaninglessness of legislative inaction).
163. See H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You’re Out: An Investigation of Professional
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REV. 369, 370-76, 387 (1988) (reviewing the eco-
nomic structure of the professional sports industry and concluding that the exemption promotes
economic inefficiency); Mark T. Gould, Perspective, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: The Pitch
Gets Closer and Closer, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 273, 279-80 (1995) (noting the adverse eco-
nomic and competitive impacts which result from the exemption); Connie Mack & Richard M.
Blau, The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 45 FLA. L.
REV. 201, 206-07 (1993) (describing owners’ anticompetitive behavior under the exemption and
its adverse effects on cities and fans); Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 169-70 (attributing
some of baseball’s woes to the monopolistic situation created by the exemption); Smith, supra
note 67, at 135-37 (citing the economic loss caused by denying antitrust redress in the courts);
Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
287 passim (1994) (weighing the economic pros and cons of lifting the exemption and conclud-
ing that baseball’s exemption should be eliminated); Craig F. Arcella, Note, Major League
Baseball’s Disempowered Commissioner: Judicial Ramifications of the 1994 Restructuring, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2420, 2447, 2467 (1997) (noting that the exemption’s elimination would be
detrimental to franchise owners because owners have tendencies toward anticompetitive be-
havior and rely on the exemption to shield that behavior); Joshua Hamilton, Comment, Con-
gress in Relief: The Economic Importance of Revoking Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 38
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1223, 1248-49 (1998) (citing economic factors as grounds for revoking
the exemption, but deferring to Congress to do so); Reynolds Holding, Do Baseball Bigwigs
Deserve Special Treatment?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1998, at 5 (noting that owners, fans, and
minor league players might ultimately benefit economically without the antitrust exemption
and acknowledging that the Curt Flood Act does not address or remedy these concerns). But
see Gary Roberts, On the Scope and Effect of Baseball’s Antitrust Exclusion, 4 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 321, 323 (1994) (concluding that “trying to abolish the exclusion would be politically
futile and unlikely to further the public interest”); Allan Selig, Major League Baseball and Its
Antitrust Exemption, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 277, 281-82 (1994) (stating, as interim Chair-
man of the Executive Council of Major League Baseball, that the antitrust exemption should
be maintained because the antitrust laws cause problems in professional sports). See generally
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 4, § 5.02, at 480-81 n.17; id. § 5.02, at 81 (Supp. 1985) (listing
more articles on the subject).
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add further support to the proposition that baseball’s antitrust
exemption is ready for judicial reconsideration.
4. Confusing and Erroneous Decisions. Confusing and
erroneous application of precedent by lower courts is another
consideration in determining whether or not to overrule precedent.164
Lower courts have been prone to handing down confusing and
possibly erroneous decisions as a consequence of the ambiguity
surrounding baseball’s antitrust exemption.165 Despite the fact that
the Flood Court explicitly found that baseball constitutes interstate
commerce,166 controversy in the courts regarding the exemption’s
scope remains. Recently, Major League Baseball has used the
exemption to control the minor leagues, franchise relocations, and
broadcasting rights.167 Analogous to lower courts’ efforts to limit the
precedent relied upon in Albrecht,168 some lower courts have limited
the scope of baseball’s antitrust exemption in situations where
precedent would seem to dictate that a broader exemption be
applied.
Lower courts disagree whether the exemption is limited to cases
involving player labor disputes, whether it encompasses the entire
business of baseball, or whether the exemption covers more than just
labor disputes but less than the entire business of baseball. Several
cases extend the exemption to the entire business of baseball without
defining the scope of the business.169 Most recently, in McCoy v. Ma-
164. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858 (1992) (specifying as a reason not
to overturn precedent the fact that “courts building upon [the precedent will not] be likely to
hand down erroneous decisions as a consequence”).
165. For example, some courts limit the exemption to cases involving the reserve clause,
some courts limit the exemption to the reserve clause and matters affecting the structure of
baseball, and some courts apply the exemption to the entire business of baseball. See infra
notes 169-77 and accompanying text. Anticompetitive harm could result if the exemption is un-
clear or defined to be overly broad because some practices will be deemed legal when they
should be invalidated under the antitrust laws.
166. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (“Professional baseball is a business . . .
engaged in interstate commerce.”).
167. See Smith, supra note 67, at 124 n.81.
168. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 13 (1997) (discussing the overruling of Schwinn);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.14 (1977) (supporting the propo-
sition that lower courts have sought to limit Schwinn’s reach) (citing Janel Sales Corp. v. Lau-
vin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir. 1986); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178,
1187 (10th Cir. 1974); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.
1973); Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-38 (3d Cir. 1970); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Ct. Cl. 1971)).
169. See, e.g., Professional Baseball Sch. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1085-86
SULLIVAN TO PRINTER.DOC 10/14/99 9:37 AM
1296 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1265
jor League Baseball,170 a district court held that the exemption applied
to the “business of baseball” and not just to the reserve clause.171
However, other courts have stated that the exemption, while broad,
does not include carte blanche antitrust immunity.172 Interestingly,
Toolson was decided with two companion baseball antitrust cases
that did not involve the reserve clause, yet the Toolson holding ap-
plied to all three cases, suggesting that the Court understood the ex-
emption to extend beyond the reserve clause.173
Other courts have reasoned that the exemption extends only to
the reserve clause. In Piazza v. Major League Baseball,174 the district
court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the exemption’s scope and
(11th Cir. 1982) (“Although it may be anomalous, the exclusion of the business of baseball
from the antitrust laws is well established.”); Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527,
541 (7th Cir. 1978) (reasoning, in a case involving a player assignment dispute between an
owner and the commissioner, that “[d]espite the two references in the Flood case to the reserve
system, it appears clear from the entire opinions in the three baseball cases . . . that the Su-
preme Court intended to exempt the business of baseball, not any particular facet of that busi-
ness, from the federal antitrust laws”) (footnotes omitted); Salerno v. American League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming the dismissal of a claim in-
volving a labor dispute between umpires and the American League because Federal Baseball
and Toolson held that “professional baseball is not subject to the antitrust laws”); Portland
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 368 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D. Or. 1971), aff’d, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th
Cir. 1974) (dismissing an antitrust claim based on a franchise expansion dispute “[o]n the basis
of numerous cases which exempt professional baseball from the application of the federal anti-
trust laws”).
170. 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
171. Id. at 457. In McCoy, a case involving a player labor dispute, the court reiterated that
“the great weight of authority recognizes that the scope of the antitrust exemption covers the
entire business of baseball.” Id.
172. See, e.g., Charles O. Finley, 569 F.2d at 541 n.51 (“We recognize that this exemption
does not apply wholesale to all cases which may have some attenuated relation to the business
of baseball.”); Postema v. National League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that an umpire labor dispute was not barred by the exemption be-
cause “although the baseball exemption does immunize baseball from antitrust challenges to its
league structure and its reserve system, the exemption does not provide baseball with blanket
immunity for anti-competitive behavior in every context in which it operates” and “[a]nti-
competitive conduct toward umpires is not an essential part of baseball”); Henderson Broad.
Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 265, 271 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (refusing to extend
baseball’s exemption to a broadcasting dispute because the exemption only covers integral as-
pects of baseball, such as leagues, clubs, and players, and not related activities that serve to en-
hance the sport’s commercial success); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Wis.
1966) (“We venture to guess that this exemption does not cover every type of business activ-
ity . . . but it does seem clear that the exemption at least covers the agreements and rules which
provide for the structure of the organization and the decisions which are necessary steps in
maintaining it.”).
173. See Smith, supra note 67, at 119 n.43.
174. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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concluded that the Flood Court had limited the exemption to the re-
serve clause.175 Citing principles of stare decisis, the court in Piazza
followed a restrictive reading of Flood.176 In contrast, also citing prin-
ciples of stare decisis, another district court stated that Piazza incor-
rectly interpreted Flood.177 Thus, case law subsequent to the Federal
Baseball–Toolson–Flood trilogy demonstrates that the exemption’s
scope remains unclear. Conflicting and erroneous decisions are still
being promulgated after Flood.
175. See id. at 436-38.
176. See id. (finding that a dispute over franchise relocation was not barred by the exemp-
tion because the Flood Court’s specific references to the reserve clause and the principle of
“result stare decisis” served to limit the exemption to reserve clause disputes); see also Butter-
worth v. National League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994) (following
the Piazza rationale despite the fact that “Piazza is against the great weight of federal cases
regarding the scope of the exemption”).
177. See McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Wash 1995).
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5. Reliance Considerations. In deciding whether or not to
overrule precedent, the Supreme Court considers the harm that
would be caused to parties who have reasonably relied on the case
law in question.178 Apart from the positive inaction doctrine, the
Flood and Toolson Courts appeared to be most concerned with the
abstract reliance issues associated with the exemption.179 Although
the Flood and Toolson Courts framed their reliance concerns in the
context of retroactive litigation,180 those Courts never specifically
identified the extent, if any, of the potential damage that would be
caused by eliminating the exemption.181
While Flood vaguely referenced possible reliance interests, State
Oil more narrowly defined reliance in the modern antitrust setting.
The State Oil Court looked closely at the economic effects incurred
by lifting the per se rule.182 More specifically, the State Oil Court
overruled Albrecht, perhaps in spite of any reliance concerns, after
determining that the fear of possible antitrust injury was overexag-
gerated183 and that the per se rule could actually harm manufacturers
and consumers.184
178. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citing as a consideration in
determining whether to overrule precedent, “whether the rule’s limitation on state power could
be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it”).
179. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (expressing “concern about the confusion
and the retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial overturning of Fed-
eral Baseball”); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (declining to hold
antitrust laws applicable, and “with retrospective effect,” partially because baseball had “been
left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing anti-trust
legislation”).
180. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (“The Court has expressed concern about the confusion and
the retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial overturning of Federal
Baseball.”); Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (“The business has thus been left for thirty years to de-
velop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present
cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation
applicable.”).
181. The Court never really identified the reliance interests, see Flood 407 U.S. at 283;
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357, because it never made it past the positive inaction doctrine to recon-
sider the exemption on its merits. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84 (“We continue to be loath . . .
to overturn [Federal Baseball and Toolson] when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed
those decisions to stand for so long, and . . . has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them
legislatively.”).
182. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997).
183. See id. (“Not only are the potential injuries cited in Albrecht less serious than the
Court imagined, the per se rule established therein could in fact exacerbate problems related to
the unrestrained exercise of market power by monopolist-dealers.”). More specifically, the re-
straint at issue might possibly have procompetitive effects. See id. at 14-15 (citing Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 343 n.13 (1990)). In addition, the State Oil
Court indicated a greater willingness to overrule antitrust precedent based “solely upon hypo-
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Likewise, the Toolson and Flood Courts’ fear of the potential
injury that would be caused by lifting the exemption is also overexag-
gerated.185 At the time Flood was decided, the Court accepted the ar-
gument that abolishing the reserve clause would be detrimental to
baseball because congressional findings and even the plaintiff’s wit-
nesses conceded that the reserve clause was not “‘wholly undesir-
able.’”186 As with Albrecht, scholarship and practice have shown oth-
erwise. The end of the reserve system did not reduce competition for
players, but rather seems to have enhanced competition for profes-
sional baseball players.187 This enhancement factor runs contrary to
the rationale underlying the reserve clause. Taking the reliance ar-
gument to its extreme, some would argue that collective bargaining
law has made the antitrust exemption meaningless as far as players’
labor issues are concerned.188 In addition, if baseball lost its antitrust
thetical effects” of price fixing. Id. at 19.
184. See id. at 18 (“[B]oth courts and antitrust scholars have noted that Albrecht’s rule may
actually harm consumers and manufacturers.”).
185. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Only a romantic view of a rather
dismal business account over the last 50 years would keep that derelict [of law that is Federal
Baseball] in midstream.” (footnote omitted)); Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 176 (ob-
serving that since the reserve clause was effectively abolished in 1976, owners’ claims of poten-
tial injury have been disproved by greater competitive balance).
186. Flood, 407 U.S. at 267 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970));
see also id. at 267, 272, 282 (deferring to trial court and congressional assessments that “‘some
form of reserve on players is a necessary element of the . . . sport’” (quoting Flood, 316 F. Supp.
at 275 (emphasis added))).
187. See Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 176 (“[A]fter almost two decades of experi-
ence with free agency, the evidence demonstrates overwhelmingly that ending the reserve sys-
tem destroyed neither baseball nor its integrity. In fact . . . academic studies have shown that
the reserve system actually hurt competitive balance in baseball.”). The fact that developments
in labor law weaken the need for the antitrust exemption also supports the idea that subsequent
legal developments have weakened the theoretical underpinnings justifying the exemption. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
188. See Kohm, supra note 85, at 1248 (“[A]ny repeal of baseball’s exemption would have
minimal impact in terms of what legal recourse would be available to the players against the
owners due to both the statutory and nonstatutory labor law exemptions from antitrust law.”);
Robbins, supra note 4, at 938 (stating that the collective bargaining antitrust exemption would
cover all labor issues raised under baseball’s exemption). While the reserve clause is now de-
funct, issues such as salary caps have kept alive the debate over the antitrust exemption. See
Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 197. But cf. Robbins, supra note 4, at 962 (stating that
application of antitrust remedies will not solve baseball players’ labor problems). Yet, even
Robbins acknowledges that the current wrangling between players and owners over the exemp-
tion seems troublesome if the exemption is truly meaningless. See id. at 970. While Robbins
dismisses the current debate over the exemption as a distraction or a public relations device,
see id. at 970-71; cf. Holding, supra note 163, at 5, the McCoy decision and the baseball antitrust
issues unaffected by the Curt Flood Act keep the exemption controversy alive within the judi-
ciary. See McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Wash 1995) (rejecting
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exemption, its practices would most likely be judged under the rule of
reason standard.189 Hence, baseball’s practices would not automati-
cally be in violation of the antitrust laws if the exemption ceased to
exist.190
Debate also surrounds the potential adverse effects on the minor
leagues should the exemption be completely abolished. The weight of
expert opinion on the matter suggests that the minor leagues would
survive if the exemption ceased to exist.191 In fact, some commenta-
tors have argued that the abolition of the exemption might leave the
minor leagues better off both economically and in terms of quality.192
The State Oil Court was also concerned with the possible harm
to manufacturers and consumers that might result if it upheld Al-
brecht’s per se rule.193 While Toolson and Flood purportedly sup-
ported baseball’s antitrust exemption based on the interests of the
entire baseball industry, the Court actually seemed most concerned
about the effect on the parties who would be sued should the ban be
lifted: the owners and the League.194 However, the Court should have
decisions that limit baseball’s antitrust exemption to something less than the entire “business of
baseball”).
189. See Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 178 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984), as grounds for supposing baseball would be subject to rule
of reason analysis); Robbins, supra note 4, at 968 (“Because of the special nature of the busi-
ness of professional sports leagues, a reviewing court would almost certainly apply the rule of
reason analysis to a . . . claim against [Major League Baseball].”).
190. See Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 180 (“[B]aseball owners would be subject to
a sophisticated and flexible rule of reason analysis that would permit them to agree on matters
reasonably necessary to accommodate the sport’s needs and the owners’ legitimate interests.”).
191. See Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty Years in the On-Deck Circle: Congress and the
Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 627, 659 (1994) (“Although the loss of
the exemption might create a significant restructuring in the financial relationship with Major
League Baseball, the need for a system to generate major league talent [ensures the continua-
tion of the minor league system].”); Smith, supra note 67, at 139 (stating that the impact on the
minor leagues would be minimal); Zimbalist, supra note 163, at 303-06 (arguing that the claim
that lifting the exemption will end minor league baseball is not credible); Charles Matthew
Burns, Note, The Scope of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 24 STETSON L. REV.
495, 496 n.8 (citing congressional testimony on the matter). But see Kohm, supra note 85, at
1254 (“[T]he effect of a repeal on the minor leagues would be difficult to predict.”).
192. See Zimbalist, supra note 163, at 306 (suggesting that lifting the exemption “should be
salutary for the minor leagues and their host cities,” even considering the variety of restructur-
ing possibilities in a postexemption era); Holding, supra note 163, at 5 (stating that the surviv-
ing minor league teams “would be better teams paying players a living wage and making major-
league owners compete for top talent with top dollar”).
193. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997) (“Indeed, both courts and antitrust
scholars have noted that Albrecht’s rule may actually harm consumers and manufacturers.”).
194. Both the Toolson and Flood Courts heavily stressed reliance concerns as reasons to
abstain from abolishing the exemption. The League and owners are the parties that rely on the
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considered more seriously the entire baseball community, which in-
cludes the players (the labor) and the fans (the consumers).195 The
injury to the laborers and consumers of baseball caused by the ex-
emption is even more apparent today than it was in the time of Tool-
son or Flood. Owners’ demands that players agree to excessive re-
strictions on competition have increased labor strife.196 The social cost
of the strife has been evidenced in the frequent player strikes.197 In
addition, fans and taxpayers are hurt financially by allowing owners
to block the expansion or relocation of franchises.198 Through their
monopoly power, owners have cost taxpayers millions in stadium
subsidies, have kept franchises out of certain cities, and have made
fans pay to view formerly free games on television.199 Depending on
the specific plan, blanket restraint proposals such as salary caps200 or
luxury taxes201 can “affirmatively harm competitive balance”202 and
exemption and have the most to lose if the exemption disappears. See supra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text.
195. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1989)
[hereinafter Ross, Monopoly] (“The economic policy of the United States, as expressed in our
antitrust laws, provides that firms should compete in an open and free marketplace to supply
consumers with the best possible product at the lowest possible price and to allocate society’s
resources efficiently.”). The owners assume an unusual position regarding the exemption.
Owners benefit if they cannot be sued by players but they suffer if they cannot sue the league
regarding marketing, relocation, and other issues specific to the individual franchise. Now, pre-
sumably, the owners will suffer more than before since the Curt Flood Act supposedly gives
major league players antitrust remedies against the owners. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-297, § 3, 112 Stat. 2824, 2824 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 27a).
196. See Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 170.
197. See id. at 169 (noting that the 1994 strike marked the eighth consecutive time baseball
had been interrupted following the expiration of a labor-management agreement); Smith, supra
note 67, at 129-30 (stating that the 1994 players strike involved financial losses to cities, players,
and owners in excess of one billion dollars). Ross also notes that “both players and consumers
would have been better off if the players had the option of using the judicial system, rather than
a work stoppage, to attack the salary cap.” Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 197. But cf.
Robbins, supra note 4, at 966 (arguing that repealing the antitrust exemption would do little
except give players some procedural advantages). However, since the procedural advantages
translate into recourse through the judicial system, the advantages may be significant. If proce-
dural advantages turn out to be insignificant, see, e.g., Holding, supra note 163, at 5 (noting that
despite antitrust recourse, labor strife has recently manifested itself in the 1998 NBA player
lockout), the Curt Flood Act will be of little value.
198. See Ross, Reconsidering, supra note 25, at 170.
199. See id. at 196.
200. In short, salary caps constitute “a complex mechanism that limits the total amount
each team can spend on players’ salaries.” Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Be-
tween Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV., 519, 521 [hereinafter
Ross, Misunderstood].
201. Luxury taxes are, in essence, punitive taxes on teams “with above average payrolls.”
Id.
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thus may be found illegal under the rule of reason analysis. Currently,
however, such restraints might be shielded from judicial scrutiny by
baseball’s exemption.203 If the Court is truly concerned about the ad-
verse effect on the laborers and consumers204 caused by upholding a
rule that has had its theoretical underpinnings called into serious
question, then the Court should overrule baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion just as it overruled the theoretical underpinnings of the per se
rule in Albrecht.
C. Principled Legal Reasoning
The individual issues that the Supreme Court considers in its
stare decisis review are part of a larger concern about the logic and
legitimacy of the Court as an institution. The Supreme Court’s power
lies “in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to de-
termine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it de-
mands.”205 Therefore, “a decision without principled justification
would be no judicial act at all.”206 Accordingly, the Court must act in a
way that allows people to accept the rationale underlying its deci-
sions.207 The Court has explicitly acknowledged the importance of
202. Id. at 523. Whether the Curt Flood Act would cover such issues is unclear. See Hold-
ing, supra note 163, at 5 (“All [the Act] does is give players the option of disbanding their union
and suing the owners for anti-competitive practices if league-contract negotiations don’t go as
the players want.”).
203. See Ross, Misunderstood, supra note 200, at 522.
204. State Oil makes clear that the Court is concerned about consumers. See State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (concluding that Albrecht’s per se invalidation of vertical maximum
price fixing was unjustified because “condemnation of practices resulting in lower prices to con-
sumers is ‘especially costly’” (citation omitted)). However, given the Flood decision, the Court
appears to be less concerned about the labor involved in the baseball industry. See Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“We must not forget, however, that
there are only some 600 major league baseball players. Whatever muscle they might have been
able to muster by combining forces with other athletes has been greatly impaired by the man-
ner in which this Court has isolated them.”).
205. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992); see also Flood, 407 U.S. at 293
n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“‘[H]owever admirable [a jurist’s] resolute adherence to the law
as it was, a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it is, operates . . . to diminish re-
spect for the courts and for law itself.’”) (quoting Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting
View, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 394, 397 (1959)).
206. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
207. See id.; see generally Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995) (arguing that the Court must appear principled and give attention to
how the public receives the reasons given for its decisions). However, the Court can lose le-
gitimacy if it overrules too frequently or if it overrules simply because it is under fire politically
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principled legal reasoning and favors basing its decisions on reasoned
analysis instead of formalistic line-drawing.208
When the views underlying precedent have changed so much
that the precedent is called into question, the Court may rule that it is
no longer bound by that precedent.209 In relating the legitimacy con-
cern back to baseball’s exemption, note that other professional sports
do not enjoy the same antitrust exemption that baseball does. For the
judicial system to subject affiliates of all other professional sports to
antitrust penalties, while dismissing baseball antitrust complaints un-
der the antitrust exemption, is illogical and unfair.210 In addition, the
exemption appears to be more and more of an unnecessary anomaly
given that other professional sports function without an antitrust ex-
emption. For example, baseball lags behind basketball financially211
and has faced increasing pressure to adopt some National Football
League practices such as revenue sharing.212 Adhering to a precedent
that logic, practicality, and fairness have all abandoned would be a
disservice to the legitimacy of the judicial system. As the State Oil
Court pointed out, little can be salvaged of a decision that was criti-
cized at its inception and which has subsequently been eroded both
theoretically and practically.213
or socially. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 866-67.
208. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)
(“[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”).
209. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 20-21 (“In the area of antitrust law, . . . [there is an] inter-
est . . . in recognizing and adapting to changing circumstances and the lessons of accumulated
experience.”); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 868 (“The promise of constancy, once given, binds its
maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the
issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete.”).
210. See Smith, supra note 67, at 124-25 (“[T]he [Major League Baseball Player’s Associa-
tion] is significantly weaker than other professional sports’ players associations, because of its
inability to challenge baseball’s labor practices under federal antitrust laws. . . . [C]ollective
bargaining remains the . . . only means of redressing player grievances.”).
211. See Kurt Badenhausen et al., More Than a Game, FIN. WORLD, June 17, 1997, at 40,
42 (stating that basketball is the most profitable sport).
212. See Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market Teams in Major
League Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323, 366-69 (1994) (discussing the labor and antitrust
issues associated with revenue sharing); Baseball’s Dilemma: How Can Small Market Teams
Survive?, S.D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 1999, at B8 (stating that baseball must adopt revenue
sharing and salary caps similar to other professional sports in order to survive); Cheap Baseball,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 18, 1998, at B6 (comparing baseball to football and stating that more
revenue sharing is “the best way to make [baseball] more competitive”); Michael K. Ozanian,
Valuation Scoreboard, FIN. WORLD, June 17, 1997, at 46, 46 (stating that baseball, like football,
already revenue shares to some extent).
213. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 21.
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CONCLUSION
The weakening of the positive inaction doctrine and the State Oil
Court’s affirmation that the Supreme Court has the power to over-
rule its prior antitrust decisions have seriously undermined the road-
block to judicial abolition of baseball’s antitrust exemption that Tool-
son and Flood seemed to create. Furthermore, the confusion in the
courts regarding the exemption’s application has limited its general
usefulness, and the reliance issues that serve as a bar to reversing
precedent are not as great as the Toolson and Flood Courts may have
feared. In fact, maintaining the exemption seems to foster more eco-
nomic harm than good. Given the theoretical and practical under-
mining of the exemption’s premises, the Supreme Court should dis-
pose of the exemption through principled legal reasoning based on
the legitimate factors that overcome stare decisis considerations.
